Three parliamentary blocs submit competing amendments ahead of the re-examination of Portugal’s citizenship law

On 31 March, the three largest parliamentary groupings in Portugal submitted competing draft amendments—two days before the Assembly of the Republic is set to revisit the citizenship provisions that were returned in December by the Constitutional Court.

The documents reveal fundamental disagreements on several key points: transitional safeguards for existing residents, a threshold tied to criminal grounds that could block access to citizenship, and whether loss of citizenship may be imposed as an additional (ancillary) criminal consequence.

All three initiatives target Decree 17/XVII (the citizenship law). However, only Chega tabled amendments to Decree 18/XVII—the Criminal Code provisions where loss of citizenship is set out as a criminal penalty. This raises questions about whether PSD and CDS-PP intend to effectively reintroduce that measure through a separate bill before Wednesday’s sitting.

Residence timelines: 6/9, 7/10, or no change?

The most visible split concerns how long foreign residents must wait before they can apply for citizenship. PSD and CDS-PP leave the deadlines unchanged from the October parliamentary text: 7 years for EU citizens and citizens of Portuguese-speaking countries (CPLP), and 10 years for all other categories.

In their draft, these provisions are shown as «[…]», meaning they would continue without adjustments.

Socialist Party (PS) proposes a shorter waiting period. Under its version, Article 6(1)(b) states that the applicant must legally reside in Portugal for at least 6 years for CPLP and EU citizens, or 9 years for citizens of other countries.

For Golden Visa holders—who are typically neither EU nor CPLP—this difference between 9 and 10 years becomes practically significant, especially given that delays today can already stretch the real timeline to 12–14 years.

At the same time, Chega does not change residence periods. Its proposal focuses instead on criminal restrictions, loss of citizenship, and a new self-sufficiency requirement.

Residence “clock”: a critical difference

The original government text removed Article 15(4) of Law 37/81—a rule, introduced by Law 2/2024, that allowed residence time to be counted from the date an application is filed, rather than from the date the AIMA authorization is issued. Since AIMA may take 2–4 years in practice to process authorizations, removing that clause would effectively add several years to the overall process.

However, PSD/CDS-PP do not restore the former rule. In their amendments, they remove the “innovative” interpretative approach that the Constitutional Court found problematic. In the explanatory memorandum they state: «requirements for access to citizenship must be assessed at the time the application is submitted».

Crucially, the wording addresses when the conditions must be met, not when the residence period starts counting. Since Article 15(4) remains removed in the PSD/CDS-PP text, the “clock” would work differently: from the date the authorization is issued, not from the date the application is lodged.

Only PS preserves the earlier approach. In Article 7(6), it explicitly provides that “the previous version of Article 15(4) of Law 37/81” applies for calculating residence periods up to 31 December 2028. This gives existing residents a three-year window to meet the thresholds under the “from the date of application” logic.

Still, as noted by Madalen(a) Monteiro (Monteiro), another interpretation may be possible. “Even if Article 15(4) is eliminated,” she argues, “there remains room for interpretation under which the count could start from the date of application.”

As a compromise, she also pointed to a scenario where the clock would begin after the deadline given to the administration for reaching a decision (currently 90 working days), provided the outcome is positive. Otherwise, she believes, control would end up being fully held by the administration, potentially breaching principles of equality and human dignity.

Transitional safeguards: the main fault line

For more than 20,000 Golden Visa investors awaiting AIMA appointments, it is the transitional provisions that will determine whether residence years are counted under the old model’s five-year horizon.

PSD/CDS-PP keep protection for procedures already underway to obtain citizenship (Article 7(2) remains «[…]» unchanged). But they simultaneously remove the “grandfather clause” and the phased transition: Articles 7(3) and 7(4) are marked «Eliminated» (deleted). As a result, residents with existing authorizations who have not yet submitted their citizenship paperwork receive nothing.

PS creates a more complex transitional system. For administrative processes already started, the previous law applies (Article 7(2)). Those who, on the date the changes take effect, already meet the previous conditions can apply under the old five-year logic until «31 de junho de 2026» (the date appears incorrect and is likely a layout/typographical error—possibly referring to 30 June).

After that window, PS proposes a graduated residence timeline: 6 years for those who would have reached the five-year threshold in 2026, 7 years for reaching it in 2027, and 8 years for reaching it in 2028 (Article 7(4)).

Madalen(a) Monteiro, founder of Liberty Legal, who in December filed an amicus curiae submission to the Constitutional Court on behalf of Golden Visa investors, described the PSD amendments as “minor,” aimed “only at the aspects identified as unconstitutional.”

In her view, PS is the only party trying to mitigate the effects of radical changes: it keeps the “from the date of application” approach until 2028 and introduces a phased transition.

The difference is indeed significant. Under PSD/CDS-PP, a non-EU (and non-CPLP) investor who moved to Portugal in 2022 and expected to qualify in 2027 would face 10 years from the date the authorization is issued. Under PS, that investor falls into the transitional category of 7 years (Article 7(4)(b), for those who would have reached the five-year threshold in 2027)—meaning the timeline could be shortened by 3 years.

Criminal obstacles: three different thresholds

The Constitutional Court struck down the original rule under which refusal of citizenship applied automatically when someone had a criminal record exceeding two years, calling it an “disproportionate restriction” on the right of access to citizenship. All three parties responded by raising the threshold, but with different scopes.

PSD/CDS-PP and PS converge on a common threshold and list of offence categories. In the PSD/CDS-PP text (Article 6(1)(f)), the applicant must not have a conviction which, upon a final court decision, provides for actual imprisonment of more than 5 years for terrorism, violent crimes (including aggravated offences), organised crime offences, crimes against State security, and also for aiding illegal immigration. A similar approach and the same five-year “barrier” appear in PS’s proposal.

The difference lies in how the mechanism to “work around” that prohibition is structured.

PSD/CDS-PP build a judicial “safety valve” via presunção ilidível (a rebuttable presumption). The assessment is carried out by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which considers six factors:

• the specific circumstances, objectively confirming or refuting whether there is effective and genuine integration into the national community;
• the sentence imposed;
• the type of crime committed;
• whether the offence was intentional or negligent;
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed;
• the risk of reoffending.

If the Public Prosecutor’s Office supports the prohibition, the applicant may initiate court proceedings to remove its effects (Article 6(15)).

PS designs the workaround differently: Article 6(14) allows the government to grant naturalisation “whenever” the same factors objectively show that failing the requirement does not exclude the presence of a genuine link through the applicant’s real integration into the national community. In other words, the decision remains within the executive branch rather than being handled through the Public Prosecutor’s mechanism.

Chega is fundamentally different. Under Article 6(1)(f), citizenship is blocked if the person has been sentenced to imprisonment of 3 years or more for any crime provided for under Portuguese law—without limiting the categories and without any exclusion mechanism.

The wording also differs. PSD/CDS-PP and PS use superior a (strictly more than five years), while Chega uses igual ou superior a (equal to or more than three years). Therefore, a conviction with a 3-year threshold (including financial crimes or fraud) under Chega could permanently close the path to citizenship.

Chega adds, PS removes

The three proposals move in opposite directions regarding Article 6(1)(i). Chega replaces the rule with a self-sufficiency test: the applicant must “have the ability to support themselves and not be a recipient of social benefits during the period of residence.” PS marks the existing subclause as one to be removed (“ELIMINAR”), while PSD/CDS-PP keep the provision unchanged.

For Golden Visa holders, Chega’s provision is unlikely to create a practical barrier; its impact will likely be more noticeable for applicants with lower incomes who follow the standard route to citizenship.

At the same time, it remains unclear whether an absolute ban on receiving any social benefits for the entire residence period would survive constitutional scrutiny.

How to define “renunciation of the national community”

The Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional a provision allowing citizenship to be withdrawn for “conduct that definitively and clearly rejects commitment to the national community,” due to insufficient clarity. Both PSD/CDS-PP and PS try to fix the issue in different ways.

PSD/CDS-PP retain the idea of assessing “the absence of effective links with the national community” under Article 9(1)(a), grounded in the material parameters of Article 6(1)(c)–(i), including consideration of convictions for “insulting national symbols.” At the same time, the removed subclauses (b) and (d) narrow the grounds compared with the original text.

PS adds a more “positive” formulation: applicants must show actions that “definitively and obviously” reject commitment to the national community, its representative institutions, and national symbols. The approach aims to address the Court’s concern about vagueness, but critics may argue that subjectivity still remains in the wording.

Fraud exception: a narrowing

Both initiatives—PSD/CDS-PP and PS—amend Article 12-B(3) to prevent citizenship obtained through fraud from being consolidated.

PSD/CDS-PP link the exception to Article 12-A, which describes obtaining citizenship based on forged documents or documents that support incorrect/non-existent facts, or through false statements. The explanatory memorandum stresses that “this exception does not affect access to citizenship for third parties acting in good faith.”

PS uses slightly different wording: consolidation of citizenship is blocked when citizenship was obtained “clearly (manifestamente) in a fraudulent manner,” again with a good-faith caveat. The term manifestamente sets a higher evidentiary threshold than the general statutory approach used in the PSD/CDS-PP version.

Loss of citizenship: Chega goes alone

Chega is the only party to table amendments to Decree 18/XVII—the Criminal Code provisions where loss of citizenship is established as an additional punishment.

In its proposal, the threshold is set at 5 years of actual imprisonment for crimes committed within 15 years after obtaining citizenship.

Reports indicate that PSD/CDS-PP allegedly narrowed the original list of offences to particularly serious crimes (e.g., intentional aggravated homicide, slavery, trafficking in human beings, rape, and sexual violence). However, the specific wording of the amendments to Decree 18—according to published information—was not among the documents received by IMI.

Chega, by contrast, expands the list. Its text introduces three new categories:

• “criminal association,” where the person is a leader or director of the association (Article 69-D(4)(h));
• trafficking in weapons and brokering weapons (under the weapons law) (Article 69-D(4)(i));
• illegal trafficking in drugs or psychotropic substances (under the drugs law) (Article 69-D(4)(j)).

These types of offences were reported to be the ones PSD/CDS-PP excluded in order to reduce the risk of disproportionality identified by the Constitutional Court.

Chega also proposes conditions for regaining citizenship after loss: 15 to 25 years for the most serious offences and 10 to 15 years for the others—both periods counted from the date the sentence takes effect (becomes final).

Political arithmetic

PSD’s parliamentary group vice-president, António Rodrigues, told RTP that the amendments include “the contribution of all” parties consulted, including PS, Chega and Iniciativa Liberal (IL). He rejected the idea of a PSD–Chega coalition agreement and said he hopes PS will support the vote.

Chega leader André Ventura denied any “incorporation” of his party’s positions and called PSD’s statement “false,” announcing his own independent proposals.

Lawyer Adriano Vieira (Apparcel Uriarte Abogados) noted that the government “depends on the support of one of these two parties to secure a parliamentary majority.” He added that Chega insists on “stricter and more restrictive measures,” while PS pushes for “longer transitional periods and softer residence requirements.” In his view, the outcome could either “bring relief to Golden Visa applicants” or “undermine expectations and investors’ trust.”

Earlier, in October 2025, the vote ended with a tally of 157 to 64: PSD, CDS-PP, Chega, IL and JPP voted in favour; against were PS, Livre, PCP, BE and PAN.

What this means for Golden Visa holders

A route to citizenship through five years remains in force until the revised version of the law takes effect. PSD/CDS-PP protect only those who have already applied for citizenship; everyone else will face new timelines immediately after the changes. Among the three options, only PS’s text contains the grandfather clause, a phased transition, and the “from the date of application” approach for counting the residence period.

Permanent residence, meanwhile, is not affected by any of the amendments. After five years, Golden Visa holders can apply for permanent residence status regardless of how the citizenship rules change.

The Wednesday debate will trigger a re-examination procedure, and the final text could theoretically still change before the final vote.

Considering a move to Portugal and looking into residency/citizenship by investment? While the parliament debates amendments to citizenship rules and residence timelines, it’s crucial to assess in advance which route is most predictable for your case. Digital Nomad will help you understand current requirements and build a clear plan—from choosing the right pathway to document support: https://digital-nomad.gr/en/goldenvisa.

Our Telegram channel about various types of Greek residence permits, digital nomad programs, and the Greek Golden Visa: @digitalnomadgr